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Abstract
Observations of quantum systems carried out by finite observers who subsequently
communicate their results using classical data structures can be described as “local
operations, classical communication” (LOCC) observations. The implementation of
LOCC observations by the Hamiltonian dynamics prescribed by minimal quantum
mechanics is investigated. It is shown that LOCC observations cannot be described
using decoherence considerations alone, but rather require the a priori stipulation of
a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) about which communicating observers
agree. It is also shown that the transfer of classical information from system to ob-
server can be described in terms of system-observer entanglement, raising the possibil-
ity that an apparatus implementing an appropriate POVM can reveal the entangled
system-observer states that implement LOCC observations.
Keywords: Decoherence; Einselection; Emergence; Entanglement; Quantum-to-classical
transition; Virtual machines
1 Introduction
Suppose spatially-separated observers Alice and Bob each perform local measurements on a
spatially-extended quantum system - for example, a pair of entangled qubits in an asymmet-
ric Bell state - and afterwards communicate their experimental outcomes to each other. This
“local operations, classical communication” (LOCC, e.g. [1] Ch. 12) scenario characterizes
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quantum key distribution, preparation of the initial states and subsequent observation of
the final states of quantum computers, and practical laboratory investigations of spatially-
extended quantum systems; indeed LOCC characterizes all situations in which two or more
observers interact with a quantum system and then report their observations by encoding
them into sharable classical data structures. Formal descriptions of LOCC scenarios gener-
ally specify the quantum system S with which the observers interact by explicitly specifying
its quantum degrees of freedom and hence its Hilbert space HS; in addition, they typically
explicitly specify the “prepared” quantum state |S〉 with which the observers interact, for
example by an expression such as ‘|S〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉A ⊗ |1〉B − |1〉A ⊗ |0〉B)’ where |0〉
and |1〉 are basis vectors and ‘A’ and ‘B’ name Alice and Bob, respectively. The “local
operations” are generally dealt with cursorily: Alice and Bob are said to measure spin or
polarization, for example, with the details of the apparatus used to do so, if any are given,
relegated to the Methods section. The “classical communication” between Alice and Bob
is rarely discussed at all. Understanding LOCC in physical terms, however, requires not
just understanding the quantum state being observed, but understanding both the “local
operations” and the “classical communication” as physical processes.
Let us begin with classical communication. Any finite message from Bob to Alice can be
represented as a finite sequence of classical bits. It must, moreover, be encoded in some
physical medium [2] - notes in a logbook, for example, or an email message, or coherent
vibrations of air molecules. Bob encodes the message and Alice receives it by performing
local operations on the physical medium employed for transmission. Successful transmission
requires, therefore, that Alice monitor the medium for messages, and that Alice and Bob
share an encoding/decoding scheme - a data structure with write and read methods - as
well as a semantics for that data structure that renders the message meaningful. These
requirements are independent of whether Alice and Bob are human beings or non-human
information-processing machines; two computers attached to the internet must share a
communication protocol (e.g. tcp/ip) and must share assumptions about both the syntax
and semantics of the data structures employed to encode transmitted messages.
The local operations performed by Alice and Bob have, therefore, two distinct targets.
Alice and Bob must each operate locally on S to extract classical information, and must
each operate locally on their shared communication medium to either encode (Bob) or
decode (Alice, and Bob if he checks his encoding) the classical information contained in the
transmitted message. Most discussions of LOCC acknowledge that the interactions with S
involve quantum measurement; most neglect the fact that, if quantum theory is assumed
to be universal, the encoding and decoding steps also involve interactions with a quantum
system: the physical medium of communication. Most, moreover, neglect the fact that
Alice and Bob are themselves quantum systems. The purpose of the present paper is to
examine LOCC from a perspective that acknowledges these facts; it is, therefore, to ask
what is required to implement LOCC in a quantum world.
The next section, “Preliminaries” discusses the fundamental assumption that quantum
theory is universal and two of its consequences: that the extraction of classical informa-
tion from quantum systems can be represented by the action of positive operator-valued
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measures (POVMs, reviewed by [1] Ch. 2), and that observers must deploy POVMs to
identify quantum systems of interest. The third section, “Decompositional equivalence and
its consequences” discusses a second fundamental assumption: that the universe as a whole
exhibits a symmetry, decompositional equivalence, that allows alternative tensor-product
structures (TPSs) for a single Hilbert space [3]. Like the assumption of universality, de-
compositional equivalence is an empirical assumption; if it is true, physical dynamics cannot
depend in any way on TPSs that may be specified as defining “systems” of interest. In
a universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, system-environment decoherence, which
depends for its definition on the specification of a TPS, can have no physical consequences,
and hence can neither create nor alter physical encodings of classical information. Ob-
servers cannot, therefore, take for granted physical encodings by their shared environment
of either the boundaries or the pointer states of specific systems of interest, as is proposed
in the “environment as witness” formulation of decoherence theory [4, 5] and quantum Dar-
winism [6, 7]. The fourth section, “Decoherence as semantics” shows that decoherence can
be represented as the action of a POVM, and hence as being a semantic or model-theoretic
mapping from physical systems to classical data structures, and in particular to classical
virtual machines. It is shown that the semantic consistency conditions for constructing
such mappings are those familiar from the consistent histories formulation of quantum
measurement (e.g. [8]). The fifth section, “Observation as entanglement” returns to the
question of how multiple observers in a LOCC setting identify and determine the state of
a single system and then communicate their results. It shows that LOCC requires an infi-
nite regress of assumptions regarding prior classical communications between the observers
involved. In the absence of further assumptions, therefore, observations under LOCC con-
ditions cannot be carried out in a universe characterized by both universal quantum theory
and decompositional equivalence. It then shows that the classical correlation between the
states of an observer and an observed system produced by the action of a POVM would
result from observer-system entanglement, and that such a correlation would be perfect if
the entanglement was monogamous. Hence observation mediated by a POVM can be re-
garded as alternative formal description of quantum entanglement; the transfer of classical
information such entanglement enables is independent of system boundaries and relative,
for any third party, to the specification of an appropriate basis for the joint system-observer
state. While this result renders the explanation of classical communication in terms of an
observer-independent physical process of “emergence” unattainable, it offers the possibility
that an apparatus implementing an appropriate POVM could reveal the specific system-
observer entanglements that implement the observation of classical outcomes. The paper
concludes that the appearance of shared, public classicality in the physical world is fully
analogous to the appearance of algorithm instantiation in classical computer science: both
are cases of a shared, jointly stipulated semantic interpretation.
3
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Assumption: Quantum theory is universal
The first and most fundamental assumption made here is that quantum theory is universal:
all physical systems are quantum systems. The universe U, in particular, is a physical
system; it is therefore a quantum system, and can be characterized by a Hilbert space
HU comprising a collection of quantum degrees of freedom. The universe is moreover, as
assumed by Everett [9], not part of anything else; it is an isolated quantum system. The
evolution of the universal quantum state |U〉, therefore, satisfies a Schro¨dinger equation
(∂/∂t)|U〉 = −(ı/~)HU|U〉, where HU is a deterministic universal Hamiltonian. This as-
sumption rules out any objective non-unitary “collapse” of |U〉; it amounts to the adoption
of what Landsman [10] calls “stance 1” regarding quantum theory, a stance that is realist
about quantum states, and therefore demands an explanation for the appearance of classi-
cality. All available experimental evidence is consistent with this universality assumption
[11]. Alice, Bob, the systems that they observe and the systems that they employ to en-
code classical communications are, on this assumption, all collections of quantum degrees
of freedom evolving under the action of the universal Hamiltonian HU.
The assumption that all physical systems are quantum systems clearly does not entail
that all descriptions of physical systems are quantum-theoretical descriptions. Some de-
scriptions are classical; others are quantum-theoretical. Classical descriptions of physical
systems are in some cases (e.g. for billiard balls) sufficient for practical purposes, while
in other cases (e.g. for electrons) they are not. The observable world appears classical
to human observers employing their unaided senses; this appearance will be referred to as
“observational classicality.” Human observers, moreover, record and communicate their ob-
servations using classical data structures, as do all artificial observers thus far constructed
by humans. Hence all descriptions of physical, i.e. quantum systems, whether they are
classical descriptions or quantum-theoretical descriptions, are both recorded for future ac-
cess and communicated using classical data structures, regardless of whether the observers
involved are humans or artifacts. It is this classicality of recorded descriptions that both
motivates and requires LOCC as a characterization of the interaction of multiple observers
with a quantum, i.e. physical system.
Under the assumption of universality, understanding the requirements of LOCC in the
case of either Alice or Bob individually clearly requires understanding quantum measure-
ment, and in particular understanding whether observational classicality can be supposed
to “emerge” from the dynamics specified by HU. If the observed system S is regarded as
a quantum information processor, this question of observational classicality becomes the
question of how the behavior of S can be interpreted as computation. How, for example,
do the unitary transformations of the quantum state of a quantum Turing machine (QTM,
[12]) or Hamiltonian oracle [13] implement a computation on a classical data structure
encoded by the system’s initial state? In what sense do the events that occur between
measurements in a measurement-based quantum computer [14] implement computation?
4
That these questions are both foundational to quantum computing and non-trivial has
been emphasized by Aaronson [15].
What the LOCC concept adds to the quantum measurement problem as traditionally pre-
sented (e.g. [10, 16]) is the requirement that two observers interact with the same system,
and then moreover interact, via a communicated message, with each other. Understanding
LOCC, therefore, requires understanding measurement as both a redundant or repeatable
process and as a social process; with the exception of some discussions of Wigner’s friend,
neither of these aspects of LOCC are considered in traditional accounts of single-observer
measurement. It will be shown below, in §3-4 and §5 respectively, that the theoretical issues
raised by these additional considerations are non-trivial.
2.2 Consequence: Measurements are actions by POVMs
If quantum theory is universal, measurements can be represented by POVMs. A POVM
is a collection {Ei} of positive-semidefinite Hilbert-space automorphisms that have been
normalized so as to sum to unity; POVMs generalize traditional projective measurements
(e.g. [17]) by dropping the requirement of orthogonality and hence the requirement that
all elements of a measurement project onto the same Hilbert-space basis. If {ESi } is a
POVM representing a measurement of the state of some quantum system S, then each
component ESj ∈ {EiS} is a Hilbert-space automorphism on HS, i.e. ESj : HS → HS; one
can also write ESj : |S〉 7→ |S′〉, where in general |S〉 6= |S′〉. Given the assumption of
universality, it is clear that any such automorphism must be implemented by the unitary
physical propagator e−(ı/~)HUt acting on the universal Hilbert space HU, and hence on |S〉
as a collection of components of some universal state |U〉. Hence a measurement can be
thought of as a physical action by a POVM, as emphasized for example by Fuchs’ [18]
depiction of a POVM as an observer’s prosthetic hand.
Treating a POVM as a collection of Hilbert-space automorphisms does not, however, cap-
ture the sense in which observations extract classical information from quantum systems.
To see how POVMs model measurement, it is useful to return to the case of a POVM with
mutually orthognal components, i.e. a von Neumann projection {Πi} defined on a Hilbert
space H. Each component Πj of a von Neumann projection {Πi} projects any state |ψ〉 ∈ H
onto a basis vector |j〉 of H. If the set {|i〉} of images of the components of {Πi} is complete
in the sense of spanning H, one can write |ψ〉 =∑j αj |j〉 for states |ψ〉 ∈ H. In this case a
general Hermitian observable M can be written M =
∑
j αjΠj where αj is the j
th possible
observable outcome of M acting on |ψ〉. Hence from an observer’s point of view, what a
projection {Πi} produces is not just a new state vector, but a real outcome value αj; {Πi}
is not just a Hilbert-space automorphism, but is also a mapping from H to the set of real
outcome values of some observable of interest.
A general POVM {ESi } can be thought of as a mapping from HS to a set of real outcome
values with two caveats. First, the components of a general POVM are not necessarily
orthogonal and hence do not, in general, all project to the same basis. Second, any finite
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observer can explicitly represent, and hence can physically encode in a classical memory or
communication medium, values with at most some finite number N of bits. Hence from
an observer’s point of view, a component ESj of a general POVM {ESi } is not just an
automorphism on HS; it is also a mapping ESj : HS → (BN , {basis}S), where BN is the
set of binary codes of length N and {basis}S is the set of bases of HS [3]. Indeed, any
collection {F Si } of mappings F Sj : HS → (BN , {basis}S) for which the probabilities P (αj) of
obtaining real outcome values αj ∈ BN sum to unity, and for which each of the components
F Sj is implementable by the unitary physical propagator e
−(ı/~)HUt acting on the universal
Hilbert space HU must be positive semi-definite (to yield real outcome values), normalized
(to yield well-defined probabilities) and be a collection of Hilbert-space automorphisms (to
be implementable by e−(ı/~)HUt); hence such a collection must be a POVM. The POVM
formalism thus represents the extraction of classical information from quantum systems in
the only way that it can be represented while maintaining consistency with the universality
assumption.
The assumption that all measurements can be represented by POVMs clearly does not
entail that an observer can explicitly write down the components of every POVM that he
or she might deploy in the course of interacting with the world. Doing so in any particular
case would require both a complete specification of the outcome values obtainable with
that POVM and a complete specification of the Hilbert space upon which it acts, or as
discussed below, a complete specification of the inverse image in HU of its set of obtain-
able outcome values. Such a specification would, for any particular POVM and hence any
particular Hilbert space, require scientific investigation of the physical system represented
by that Hilbert space to be complete. Classical theorems [19, 20] restricting the com-
pleteness of system identification strongly suggest that such completeness is infeasible in
principle. Hence explicitly-specified POVMs can at best be viewed as predictively-adequate
approximations based on experimental investigations carried out thus far; in practice such
POVMs are available only for systems with small numbers of (known or stipulated) degrees
of freedom.
2.3 Consequence: Observers must identify the systems they ob-
serve
When a new graduate student enters a laboratory, he or she is introduced to the various
items of apparatus that the laboratory employs. The reason for this ritual is obvious: the
student cannot be expected to reliably report the state of a particular apparatus if he or
she cannot identify that apparatus. Traditional discussions of quantum measurement take
the ability of observers to identify items of apparatus for granted. For example, Ollivier,
Poulan and Zurek define “objectivity” for physical systems operationally as follows:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
6
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
(p. 1 of [4]; p. 3 of [5])
Nothing is said in this definition, or in the surrounding discussion [4, 5], about how observers
are able to “access” a physical system “without prior knowledge” of such state variables as
its location, size or shape, and without “prior agreement” about which item in their shared
environment constitutes the system of interest. To find the identification of physical systems
by observers treated explicitly, one must look to cybernetics, where unique identification
of even classical finite-state machines (FSMs) by finite sequences of finite observations is
shown to be impossible in principle [19, 20], or to the cognitive neuroscience of perception,
where the identification in practice of individual systems over extended periods of time is
recognized as a computationally-intensive heuristic process [21, 22, 23].
In practice, observers identify items of laboratory apparatus by finite sets of classically-
specified criteria: location, size, shape, color, overall appearance, laboratory-affixed labels,
brand name. These criteria are encodable as finite binary strings. If quantum theory is uni-
versal, items of laboratory apparatus are quantum systems, and hence are characterizable
by Hilbert spaces comprising their quantum degrees of freedom. Observing a laboratory
apparatus, therefore, requires deploying an operator that maps a collection of quantum
degrees of freedom to a finite set of finite binary strings; by the reasoning above, such
operators can only be POVMs. Identifying a system of interest clearly requires observ-
ing it; hence an observer can only identify a system of interest by deploying a POVM.
Call POVMs deployed to identify systems of interest “system-identifying” POVMs. For
simplicity, a system-identifying POVM can be regarded as yielding as output just the con-
ventionalized name of the system it identifies, e.g. ‘S’ or ‘the Canberra R© Ge(Li) detector’
[3].
The formal definition of system-identifying POVMs is complicated by two related issues.
First, the vast majority of systems identified by human observers are characterized, like
laboratory apparatus are characterized, not by possible outcome values of their quantum
degrees of freedom, but by possible outcome values of bulk degrees of freedom such as macro-
scopic size or shape. The exceptions - the systems that those who reject the universality of
quantum theory consider to be the only bona fide “quantum systems” - are systems defined
by particular values of quantum degrees of freedom, as electrons or the Higgs boson are
currently defined within the Standard Model, or are systems defined by certain observable
behaviors of macroscopic apparatus, as electrons were defined in the late 19th century. The
second complication is that observers, as emphasized by Zurek [24, 25] and others, typically
interact not with systems of interest themselves, but with their surrounding environments.
While in the case of macroscopic systems such as laboratory apparatus this environment
may be treated using a straightforward approximation, for example as the ambient pho-
ton field, in the case of either microscopic or very distant systems it is complicated by
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the inclusion of laboratory apparatus; our interactions with presumptive Higgs bosons, for
example, are via an environment containing the ATLAS [26] or CMS [27] detectors. These
complicating issues are not significantly simplified by considering non-human observers; the
components of such observers that record classical records are, with the exception of such
things as blocks of plastic that record the passage of cosmic rays, almost as distant from
the microscopic events to which their records refer as are their human minders.
In recognition of the role of the intervening environment in the observation and hence
identification of systems of interest, it has been proposed that system-identifying POVMs
be defined, in general, over either the physically-implemented information channel with
which an observer interacts (i.e. the observer’s environment) [3] or over the universe U as
a whole [28]. The latter definition is adopted here, as it simplifies the description of LOCC
by allowing two or more observers to be regarded as deploying the same system-identifying
POVM. Defining system-identifying POVMs over all of U acknowledges, moreover, the
actual epistemic position of any finite observer. Observations are information-transferring
actions by the observer’s environment on the observer. Without a complete, deterministic
theory of the behavior of U, such actions cannot be predicted precisely; without sufficient
recording capacity to record the state of every degree of freedom of U at the instant of
observation, such actions cannot be replicated precisely. Any finite observer can, therefore,
at best predict or retrodict only approximately and heuristically what degrees of freedom of
U might be causally responsible for any particular episode of observation. An observer can,
however, be sure that such degrees of freedom are within U, so defining system-identifying
POVMs over U can be viewed as an exercise of epistemic conservatism.
Defining system-identifying POVMs over U as a whole does not render observations non-
local. Any finite observer must expend finite energy to record the outcomes obtained by
deploying a POVM; hence any observation requires finite time. Any finite observer can,
moreover, deploy a POVM for only a finite time. A finite observer can, therefore, regard
a system-identifying POVM - or any POVM - as extracting classical information from at
most a local volume with a horizon at c∆t, where ∆t is the period of observation. Quantum
information may originate outside this volume by entanglement, but such entanglement is
undetectable in principle by the observer. Alice can only regard classical information ex-
tracted from a quantum system employed as a communication channel as a message from
Bob if Bob is in her light-cone; LOCC requires timelike, not spacelike, separation of ob-
servers.
Defining system-identifying POVMs over U as a whole does not, moreover, resolve the
question of how such POVMs - or how any POVMs - can yield outcome values for bulk
degrees of freedom such as macroscopic size or shape. This question is, clearly, the ques-
tion of quantum measurement itself; in particular, it is the question of the “emergence of
classicality” that is taken up in §4 below.
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3 Decompositional equivalence and its consequences
3.1 Assumption: Our universe exhibits decompositional equiva-
lence
A fundamental requirement of observational objectivity, and hence of science as practiced,
is that reality is independent of the language chosen to describe it. This fundamental
assumption that reality is independent of the descriptive terms and hence the semantics
chosen by observers - in particular, human observers - underlies the assumption in scientific
practice that any arbitrary collection of physical degrees of freedom can be stipulated to be
a “system of interest” and named with a symbol such as ‘S’ without this choice of language
affecting either fundamental physical laws or their outcomes as expressed by the dynamical
behavior of the degrees of freedom contained within S. It similarly underlies the assumption
that, given the technological means, an experimental apparatus to investigate the behavior
of S can be designed and constructed without altering either fundamental physical laws or
the dynamical behavior of the degrees of freedom contained within S. These assumptions
operate prior to apparatus-dependent experimental interventions into the behavior of S, and
hence prior to observations of S, both logically and, in the course of practical investigations
of microscopic degrees of freedom by means of macroscopic apparatus, temporally.
This fundamental assumption that reality is independent of semantics can be generalized
to state an assumed dynamical symmetry: the universal dynamics HU is asumed to be
independent of, and hence symmetric under arbitrary modifications of, boundaries drawn
in HU by specifications of tensor product structures. Call this symmetry decompositional
equivalence [3]. Stated formally, decompositional equivalence is the assumption that if
S⊗ E = S′ ⊗E′ = U, the dynamics HU = HS +HE +HS−E = HS′ +HE′ +HS′−E′, where
S and S′ are arbitrarily chosen collections of physical degrees of freedom, E and E′ are their
respective “environments” and HS−E and HS′−E′ are, respectively, the S− E and S′ − E′
interaction Hamiltonians. Such equivalence of TPSs of HU can be alternatively expressed
in terms of the linearity of HU: if HU =
∑
ij Hij where the indices i and j range without
restriction over all quantum degrees of freedom within HU, decompositional equivalence is
the assumption that the interaction matrix elements 〈i|Hij|j〉 do not depend on the labels
assigned to collections of degrees of freedom by specifications of TPSs. Decompositional
equivalence is thus consistent with the general philosophical position of microphysicalism
(for a recent review, see [29]), but involves no claims about explanatory reduction, and
indeed no claims about explanation at all; it requires only that emergent properties of
composite objects exactly supervene, as a matter of physical fact, on the fundamental
interactions of the microscale components of those objects.
As is the assumption that quantum theory is universal, the assumption that the universe
satisfies decompositional equivalence is an empirical assumption. Its empirical content is
most obvious in its formulation as the assumption that interaction matrix elements 〈i|Hij|j〉
do not depend on specifications of TPSs. This is an assumption that the pairwise interac-
tion Hamiltonians Hij are not just independent of where and when the degrees of freedom
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labeled by i and j interact, but are also independent of any other classical information that
might be included in the specification of a reference frame from which the interaction of i
and j might be observed. As such, it is similar in spirit to Tegmark’s “External Reality Hy-
pothesis (ERH)” that “there exists an external physical reality completely independent of
us humans” ([30] p. 101). If taken literally, however, the ERH violates energy conservation,
as it allows human beings to behave arbitrarily without affecting “external physical reality”
and vice-versa. The assumption of decompositional equivalence, on the other hand, does
not involve, entail, or allow decoupling of observers or any other systems from their envi-
ronments; any evidence that energy is not conserved, or evidence that energy is conserved
but not additive would be evidence that decompositional equivalence is not satisfied in our
universe. Were our universe to fail in fact to satisfy decompositional equivalence, any shift
in specified system boundaries - any change in the TPS of HU - could be expected to alter
fundamental physical laws or their dynamical outcomes; in such a universe, the notions of
“fundamental physical laws” and “well-defined dynamics” would be effectively meaningless.
It is, therefore, assumed in what follows that decompositional equivalence is in fact satisfied
in our universe U, and hence that the dynamics HU is independent of system boundaries.
3.2 Consequence: System-environment decoherence can have no
physical consequences
The assumption of decompositional equivalence has immediate, but largely unremarked,
consequences in two areas: the characterization of system-environment decoherence and
the characterization of system identification by observers. Let us consider decoherence
first. The usual understanding of system-environment decoherence (e.g. [24, 25, 31, 32]) is
that interactions between a system S and its environment E, where S⊗ E = U is a TPS
of HU, select eigenstates of the S - E interaction HS−E. Such environmentally-mediated
superselection or einselection [33, 34] assures that observations of S that are mediated by
information transfer through E will reveal eigenstates of HS−E; in the canonical example,
observations of macroscopic objects mediated by information transfer through the ambient
visible-spectrum photon field reveal eigenstates of position. From this perspective, it is the
quantum mechanism of einselection that underlies the classical notion that the “environ-
ment” of a system - whether this refers to the ambient environment or to an experimental
apparatus - objectively encodes the physical state of the system, where “objectively” has
the sense given in the Ollivier-Poulin-Zurek definition [4, 5] quoted in §2.3.
Two features of this standard account of decoherence deserve emphasis. First, the idea
that the environment einselects particular eigenstates of S in an observer-independent way
- that environmental einselection dependes only on HS−E, where both S and E are spec-
ified completely independently of observers - allows decoherence to mimic “collapse” as a
mechanism by which the world prepares or creates classical information about particular
systems that observers can then detect. In this picture, as in the traditional Copenhagen
picture, observers have nothing to do with what “systems” are available to observe: the
world - in the decoherence picture, the environment - reveals some systems as “classical”
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and not others. The sense of “objectivity” defined by Ollivier, Poulin and Zurek [4, 5]
depends critically on this assumption; without it, the idea that observers can approach the
world “without prior knowledge” of the systems it contains becomes uninterpretable. The
second thing to note is that the formal mechanism of “tracing out the environment” in
decoherence calculations [24, 25, 31, 32] corresponds physically to an assumption that en-
vironmental degrees of freedom are irrelevant to the system-observer interaction, i.e. to an
assumption that the physical interaction HS−O, where O is the observer, is independent of
E. This assumption straightforwardly conflicts with the idea that observation - the S−O
interaction - is mediated by E. This conflict between the formalism of decoherence and
its model theory suggests that the trace operation is at best an approximate mathematical
representation of the physics of decoherence.
By definition, einselection depends on the HamiltonianHS−E, which is defined at the bound-
ary, in Hilbert space, between S and E [33, 34]. In a universe that satisfies decompositional
equivalence, this boundary can be shifted arbitrarily without affecting the interactions be-
tween quantum degrees of freedom, i.e. without affecting the interaction Hij, and hence
without affecting the matrix element 〈i|Hij|j〉, between any pair of degrees of freedom i
and j within U. An arbitrary boundary shift, in other words, has no physical consequences.
In particular, a boundary shift that transforms S⊗ E into an alternative TPS S′ ⊗ E′ has
no physical consequences for the values of matrix elements 〈i|Hij|j〉 where i and j are de-
grees of freedom within the intersection E ∩ E′, and hence has no physical consequences
for states of E ∩E′ or for the classical information that such states encode. The encodings
within E ∩E′ of arbitrary states of S and S′, and hence of einselected pointer states of S
and S′ are, therefore, entirely independent of the boundaries of these systems, and hence
entirely independent of the Hamiltonians HS−E and HS′−E′ defined at those boundaries.
The encoding of information about S in E is, in other words, entirely a result of the action
of HU =
∑
ij Hij , and is entirely independent of specified system boundaries or “emergent”
system-environment interactions definable at such specified boundaries.
It has been proposed, under the rubric of “quantum Darwinism” [6, 7], that environmental
“witnessing” of the pointer states of particular macroscopic systems by einselection explains
the observer-independent “emergence into classicality” of such systems, and hence explains
the observer-independent existence of the “classical world” of ordinary human experience
(see also [10, 31, 32]). In a universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, the einselection
of pointer states as eigenstates of system-environment interactions cannot, as shown above,
be a physical mechanism, and hence cannot underpin an observer-independent “objective”
[4, 5] encoding of classical information about some particular systems at the expense of
classical information about the states of other possible systems in such a universe. In a
universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, the shared environment encodes the states
of all possible embedded systems, or none at all. The notion that environmental witnessing
and quantum Darwinism explain the “emergence of classicality” collapses in a universe
satisfying decompositional equivalence, as both require that einselection physically and
observer-independently encode the states of some but not all “systems” in the state of E
[28].
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The physics of continuous fluid flow provides a simple example of decompositional equiv-
alence and its consequences for einselection. It is commonplace to describe fluid flow in
terms of deformable voxels, stipulated to be cubic at some initial time t0, that contain
some particular collection of molecules. The stipulation of such a voxel has no effect on
the intermolecular interactions between the molecules composing the fluid, whether these
molecules are within, outside, or on opposite sides of the boundary of the voxel. Stipulation
of a voxel boundary immediately defines, however, a Hamiltonian Hin−out that describes
the bulk interaction between the molecules within the voxel and those outside. This bulk
interaction can be viewed as decohering the collective quantum state |in〉 of the molecules
within the voxel, with a decoherence time at room temperature and pressure of substantially
less than 10−20 s [35], and as einselecting |in〉 as an eigenstate of position within the fluid
at all subsequent times. Such einselection prevents the wavefunction |in(t)〉 from spreading
into a macroscopically-extended spatial superposition, just as decoherence and einselection
by interplanetary dust, gasses and radiation prevent the wavefunction of Hyperion from
doing so [36]. Does the state of the fluid outside the stipulated voxel objectively encode
the position of the continuously-deforming voxel boundary at which this einselection takes
place? Could observers with no prior knowledge of the stipulated voxel boundary determine
its position by observing the state of the fluid? Obviously they could not.
The situation with bulk material objects appears, intuitively, to be different from the fluid-
flow situation just described. When viewed in terms of pairwise-interactions between the
quantum degrees of freedom of individual atoms, however, the intuitive difference vanishes.
Consider a uniform sphere of Pb embedded in a solid mass of Plexiglas R© plastic. The
interatomic interactions between Pb, C, O and H atoms are completely independent of
whether the Pb sphere, the Pb sphere together with a surrounding spherical shell of plastic,
a voxel of Pb entirely within the Pb sphere, or a voxel containing only plastic is considered
the “system of interest.” The boundary of the system stipulated, in each of these cases, is
the site of action of a Hamiltonian Hin−out that describes the bulk interaction between the
atoms within the stipulated boundary and those outside; the action of this Hamiltonian
einselects positional eigenstates of the collective quantum state of the atoms inside the
boundary just as it does in the case of a voxel boundary in a fluid. Observers of the states
of some arbitrary sample of the atoms in the plastic part of this combined system would,
however, be no more capable of determining the site of a stipulated boundary than observers
of some arbitrary sample of the fluid molecules in the previous example.
As a final example, consider observers of the experimental apparatus employed by Brune et
al. [37] to follow the decoherence of single Rb atoms within an ion trap. Would an observer
unfamiliar with the design or purpose of this apparatus, for example a new graduate student,
who observed the behavior of its externally-accessible degrees of freedom - either quantum
degrees of freedom or bulk macroscopic degrees of freedom such as pointer positions or
readouts from digital displays - be capable of inferring the boundary between the trapped
Rb atoms and the apparatus itself, including the magnetic and various electromagnetic
fields it generates? Clearly not. The boundary between the quantum system comprising
the trapped Rb atoms and the quantum system comprising the internal radiative degrees
12
of freedom is stipulated by theory, and this theory must be understood to interpret the
behavior of the apparatus as a measurement of decoherence time. Observers of such an
apparatus, in other words, must have prior knowledge of the system they are observing and
must have prior agreements about what the bulk macroscopic states of the system indicate
- about what the characters displayed on the readouts mean, for example - to comprehend
the operation of the apparatus. The criteria for “objectivity” offered by Ollivier, Poulan
and Zurek [4, 5] and quoted in §2.3 above fail utterly in this case, just as they do for the
“objectivity” of voxel boundaries in fluids or the intuitively “obvious” boundary of a Pb
sphere embedded in plastic. As in the previous examples, what counts as the boundary of
the “system of interest” contained within an ion trap is established by an agreed convention
among the observers, one that can be changed arbitrarily without changing the physical
dynamics occurring within the ion trap in any way.
If decoherence has no physical consequences for interaction matrix elements, it can have no
consequences for entanglement. The total entanglement in a quantum universe satisfying
decompositional equivalence is, therefore, strictly conserved. Measurements, in particular,
cannot physically destroy entanglement, and hence cannot create von Neumann entropy.
The state |U〉 can, in this case, be considered to be a pure quantum state with von Neumann
entropy of zero at all times. This situation is in stark contrast to that of a universe in which
decompositional equivalence is violated, i.e. a universe in which the dynamics do depend
on system boundaries, either via a physical process of “wave-function collapse” driven
by measurement or a physical and therefore ontological “emergence” of bounded systems
driven by decoherence. In this latter kind of universe, entanglement is physically destroyed
by decoherence and von Neumann entropy objectively increases. A countervailing physical
process that creates entanglement, either between measurements or in regions of weak
decoherence, and hence decreases von Neumann entropy must be postulated to prevent
such a universe from solidifying into an objectively classical system, a kind of system that
our universe demonstrably is not.
3.3 Consequence: Identification of systems by observers is intrin-
sically ambiguous
While they cannot, without violating decompositional equivalence, physically destroy en-
tanglement, observations nonetheless have real-valued outcomes that can be recorded in
classical data structures and reported by one observer to another using classical commu-
nication. If the “systems” that these outcome values describe cannot be assumed to be
specified for observers by decoherence and environmental witnessing, they must be specified
by observers themselves, by the deployment of system-identifying POVMs. It was argued
in §2.3 above that both the role of the environment in mediating observations and the de
facto epistemic position of finite observers support defining system-identifying POVMs not
over the particular sets of quantum degrees of freedom - the particular Hilbert spaces and
thus TPSs of U - corresponding to recordable outcome values, but over U as a whole. With
the assumption of decompositional equivalence, this broad approach to defining POVMs
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becomes not just advisable but inescapable. If system boundaries can be shifted arbitrarily
without physical consequences, they can be shifted arbitrarily without consequences for the
recording of observed outcome values in physical media. Hence the outcome values recorded
following deployment of a POVM must be independent of arbitrary shifts of the boundary
within HU, and hence in the TPS of U, over which the POVM is defined. This can only be
the case if the POVM is not defined over one component of a fixed TPS, but rather over
all of HU.
Recall that any finite observer is restricted to a finite encoding of the outcomes obtained
with any POVM; any POVM can be considered a mapping to binary codes of some finite
length N . This condition can be met by composing an arbitrary POVM {Ei} with a
nonlinear function Iǫ such that:
〈U|IǫEk |U〉 =
{ 〈U|Ek |U〉 if 〈U|Ek |U〉 ≥ ǫ;
0 if 〈U|Ek |U〉 < ǫ (1)
for some finite resolution ǫ. Defining any POVM {Ei} over all of HU as in (1) renders
the definition of “system” implicit: a system S is whatever returns finite outcome values
αSi when acted upon by some POVM {ESi } composed with Iǫ. The detectable degrees of
freedom of such a system are, at some time t, the degrees of freedom in the inverse images
Im−1ESk of the components E
S
k for which 〈U|ESk |U〉 ≥ ǫ at t.
In general, many TPSs of HU will satisfy (1) for any given {ESi }; the collections of quan-
tum degrees of freedom represented by the “system” components of these TPSs will be
indistinguishable in principle by an observer deploying {ESi }. Observations in any uni-
verse satisfying decompositional equivalence thus satisfy a symmetry, called “observable-
dependent exchange symmetry” in [38]: any two systems S and T for which a POVM {ESi }
returns identical sets of outcome values when composed with Iǫ can be exchanged arbitrar-
ily without affecting observations carried out using {ESi }. To borrow an example from [38],
many distinct radioactive sources may appear identical to an observer equipped only with
a Geiger counter. It is shown in [38] that all observational consequences of the no-cloning
theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem and Bell’s theorem follow from observable-dependent
exchange symmetry. Decompositional equivalence is sufficient, therefore, for the universe
to appear quantum-mechanical, not classical, to finite observers whose means of collecting
classical information can be represented by POVMs.
By imposing observable-dependent exchange symmetry on observers, the assumption of de-
compositional equivalence removes the final sense in which observational classicality might
be regarded as objective classicality: two observers who record the same outcomes can no
longer infer that their respective POVMs have detected the same collection of quantum
degrees of freedom. As observable-dependent exchange symmetry applies, in principle, to
all quantum systems, it applies not just to the “systems of interest” to which classically
communicated outcome values refer, but to the physical media into which such outcome
values are encoded. The “measurement problem” in the current framework is thus the
problem of explaining not only how discrete outcome values are obtained from quantum
systems, but how classical data structures encoding such values are implemented by the
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collections of quantum degrees of freedom that constitute communication channels, includ-
ing the collections of quantum degrees of freedom that constitute the apparently-classical
memories of observers. The measurement problem in this formulation is thus the full prob-
lem of understanding LOCC. This formulation of the measurement problem is similar to
those encountered in the multiple worlds [9], multiple minds [39] or consistent histories [8]
formulations of quantum theory, all of which assume purely unitary evolution; however,
it rejects the implicit ontological assumption, common to these standard approaches, that
“systems” and hence TPSs can be regarded as constants across “branches” or histories, and
therefore rejects the assumption that “classical communication” can be taken for granted
as being physically unproblematic.
4 Decoherence as semantics
4.1 Decoherence as implemented by a POVM
If decoherence is not a physical process by which the environment creates classical infor-
mation for observers, what is it? It is suggested in [3], and shown in detail in [28] that
decoherence can be self-consistently and without circularity viewed as a purely informational
process, a model-theoretic or semantic mapping from quantum states to classical informa-
tion. It is, therefore, reasonable to think of decoherence as implemented by a POVM. To
see this, it is useful to reconceptualize observation not as the collection by observers of
pre-existing classical information, but as a dynamical outcome of the continuous action by
the environment on the physical degrees of freedom composing the observer. If an arbitrary
system S interacts with its environment E via a Hamiltonian HS−E, a POVM {ESi } can be
defined as a mapping:
ESk : |k〉 7→ αSk =
∑
i
〈i|Hik|k〉/
∑
ij
〈i|Hij|j〉, (2)
where i labels degrees of freedom of S and k and j label degrees of freedom of E. This POVM
maps each degree of freedom of E to the real normalized sum of its matrix elements, and
hence to its total coupling, with the degrees of freedom of S, and hence naturally represents
the encoding of |S〉 in |E〉. It thus takes the slogan “decoherence is continuous measurement
by the environment” literally.
In a universe that satisfies decompositional equivalence, the meanings of “S” and “E” in (2)
can be shifted arbitrarily provided S⊗ E = U. Suppose an observer O deploys a POVM
{Ei} defined overU, such that the inverse image Im−1Ek is outsideO for all components Ek
for which 〈U|Ek |U〉 ≥ ǫ. In this case, O can be considered the “system” and ∪k(Im−1Ek) ⊂
U where 〈U|Ek |U〉 ≥ ǫ can be considered the “environment” in (2); the Hamiltonian Hik
then characterizes the observer-environment interaction, and encodes classical information -
the outcome values αk - about ∪k(Im−1Ek) into |O〉. Hence (2) provides a general definition
of decoherence as the deployment of a POVM by an observer. For observers embedded in a
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relatively static environment, for which the total observer-environment interaction
∑
ikHik
is nearly constant, (2) is reasonably interpreted as defining a single, continuously-deployed
POVM. For observers embedded in highly-variable environments that nonetheless exhibit
some periodicity, as most human observers are, it is reasonable to view (2) as describing the
deployment of not one but a periodic sequence of POVMs, each normalized over a subset
of the environmental degrees of freedom with which O interacts. As such a sequence must
be finite for a finite observer, a finite observer can only be viewed as decohering his, her
or its environment in a finite number of ways. Hence unlike the “environment as witness,”
a finite observer as witness can physically encode the states of at most a finite number of
distinct “systems.” Because the POVMs encoded by finite observers are limited in their
resolution by Iǫ, each of the distinct “systems” representable by a finite observer is in fact
an equivalence class under observable-dependent exchange symmetry.
Using (2), any collection of Hilbert-subspace boundaries that enclose disjoint collections
of degrees of freedom and hence define distinct “systems” Sµ can be represented by a
collection of distinct POVMs {Eµi }. The detectable outcome values produced by these
POVMs have non-overlapping inverse images; hence they all mutually commute. If these
POVMs are regarded as all acting at each of a sequence of times ti, their outcomes at
those times can be considered to be a sequence of real vectors αµi . These vectors form a
consistent decoherent history of the Sµ at the ti, in the sense defined by Griffiths [8]. In a
universe in which decoherence is an informational process, the number of such consistent
decoherent histories and hence the number of “classical realms” [40] is limited only by the
number of distinct sets of subspaces of HU, i.e. is combinatorial in the number of degrees
of freedom of HU. Each of these histories, as a discrete time sequence of real vectors, can
be regarded as a sequential sample of the state transitions of a classical finite state machine
(FSM; [19]). As shown by Moore [20], no finite sequence of observations of an FSM is
sufficient to uniquely identify the FSM; hence no finite sample of any decoherent history is
sufficient to identify the TPS boundaries at which the POVMs contributing to the history
are defined, confirming the observable-dependent exchange symmetry of observations in a
universe satisfying decompositional equivalence.
4.2 Decoherence defines a virtual machine
A classical virtual machine is an abstract machine representable by an algorithm executed
on a classical Turing machine [41, 42]; any executable item of software, from an operating
system to a word processor or a numerical simulation, defines a virtual machine. An
execution trace of a virtual machine V is the sequence of state transitions that V executes
from a some given input state. Any classical FSM is a classical virtual machine; hence
any finite sequence of observations made with a POVM can be represented as an execution
trace of a classical virtual machine. Considering that an arbitrary algorithm A can be
employed to choose which of a collection of mutually-commuting POVMs to deploy at a
given time point tk, it is clear that any consistent decoherent history ofU can be represented
as an execution trace of a classical virtual machine. Hence decoherence can, in general,
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be represented as a mapping of HU to the space of classical virtual machines, i.e. by a
diagram such Fig. 1; as such a mapping takes quantum states to classical information, it
can be represented as a POVM {Ei}. The requirement that this diagram commutes is the
requirement that the action of the physical propagator e−(ı/~)HUt acting from tn to tn+1 is
represented, by the mapping {Ei}, as a classical state transition from the nth to the (n+1)th
state of some virtual machine V. This commutativity requirement is fully equivalent to the
commutativity requirement that defines consistency of observational histories of U (e.g. [8]
Eqn. 10.20). Hence an evolution HU is consistent under a decoherence mapping {Ei} if it
can be interpreted as an implementation of a classical virtual machine.
Virtual machine level:
Physical state level:
Virtual Machine V
... ✲ |Vn〉 ✲ |Vn+1〉 ✲ ...
{Ei}|n
✻ ✻
{Ei}|n+1
e−(ı/~)HU (t)
... ✲ |U(tn)〉 ✲ |U(tn+1)〉 ✲ ...
Fig. 1: Semantic relationship between physical states of U and einselected virtual states |Vi〉
of a virtual machine V implemented by U. Commutativity of this diagram assures that the
decoherence mapping {Ei} is consistent.
The semantic relationship shown in Fig. 1 is familiar: it is the relationship by which
the behavior of any physical device is interpreted as computation, i.e. as execution of an
algorithm characterized as an abstract virtual machine V. Any consistent decoherence
mapping can, therefore, be regarded as an interpretation of the time evolution of U as
classical computation. As the outcome values returned by any mapping {Ei} deployed by a
finite observer must be collected within a finite time, any such mapping interprets only some
local sample of the time evolution of U as computation. This perspective on decoherence
is consistent with the cybernetic intuition - the intuition expressed by the Church-Turing
thesis - that any classical dynamical process, and in particular any classical communicative
process can be represented algorithmically.
5 Observation as entanglement
5.1 Classical communication is regressive
We can now return to Alice and Bob, who each perform local observations of a quantum
system and then exchange their results by classical communication. If the dynamics in U
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exhibit decompositional equivalence, Alice and Bob cannot rely on decoherence by their
shared environment to uniquely identify the system of interest; instead they must each rely
on their own POVM to identify it. Observable-dependent exchange symmetry prevents
them, moreover, from determining by observation that they have identified the same system
of interest; given (2), they cannot determine without observational access to all degrees of
freedom of U whether they are deploying the same system-identifying POVM. Under these
conditions, what is the meaning of LOCC?
The first thing to note is that any answer to this question that relies on prior agreements
between Alice and Bob is straightforwardly regressive, and hence incapable of explaining
anything. How, for example, do Alice and Bob know which POVM to deploy in order to
perform a joint observation? How, in other words, do observers coordinate their observa-
tions, independently of whether they manage to observe a single, shared system? There are
two possibilities, as illustrated in Fig. 2. One involves classical communication: in line with
the canonical scenario, some third party presents each observer with a qubit, and instructs
them on how to observe it. The other, more in line with laboratory practice, involves Alice
and Bob jointly observing the production of the pair, and then each transporting one of the
qubits to a separate site for further observation. This second option reduces the problem
of selecting the correct POVM to employ for the subsequent observations to the problem
of resolving the joint system-identification ambiguity when the production of S is jointly
observed.
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(A)
Alice Bob
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❆❑
“Use {ASi }”
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✁✕
“Use {BSi }”
Classical
Source
t1
Alice Bob
✻
{ASi }
✻
{BSi }
S
t2✲
e−(ı/~)HU (t)
(B)
Alice Bob
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❆❑
{ASi }
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✁✕
{BSi }
S
t1
Alice Bob
✻
{ASi }
✻
{BSi }
S
t2✲
e−(ı/~)HU (t)
Fig. 2: Two options for coordinating the selection of POVMs {ASi } and {BSi } by Alice and Bob,
respectively. (A) Alice and Bob receive POVM selection instructions from a classical source. (B)
Alice and Bob jointly observe the production of S and agree that their selected POVMs identify it.
From the perspective of the observers, the two processes illustrated in Fig. 2 both involve
the receipt of classical information at t1 and its use in directing observations at t2; they
differ only in the source of the information received at t1. As noted earlier, however, the only
means of obtaining classical information provided by quantum theory is the deployment of
a POVM. The two processes differ, therefore, only in which POVM the observers deploy
at t1: in (A) they each deploy a POVM that identifies and determines the state of the
“classical source,” while in (B) they each deploy a POVM that identifies and determines
the state of S. Hence the coordination question asked at t2 can also be asked at t1; even if
the intrinsic ambiguity of observations with POVMs is ignored, the LOCC scenario cannot
get off the ground without an agreement between the observers about which POVM to
deploy at t1.
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In order to reach an agreement about which POVMs to deploy at t1, the observers must ex-
change classical information. Each observer must, therefore, deploy a POVM that enables
the acquisition of classical information from the other; call Alice’s POVM for acquiring infor-
mation from Bob “{ABi }” and Bob’s POVM for acquiring information from Alice “{BAi },”
and suppose that these POVMs are deployed at some time t0. Clearly the same question
can be asked at t0 as at t2 and t1, and clearly it cannot be answered by postulating yet
another agreement, another classical communication, and another deployment of POVMs.
The same kind of regress infects any simple joint assumption by Alice and Bob that they
are observing the same system, an assumption that must be communicated to be effective.
Any instance of measurement under LOCC conditions, in other words, requires the postu-
lation of a priori classical communication between the observers, and hence requires that
the observers themselves be regarded as classically objective a priori. Minimal quantum
mechanics with decompositional equivalence provides no mechanism by which such a priori
classical objectivity can be achieved; hence minimal quantum mechanics with decompo-
sitional equivalence does not support LOCC. At best, minimal quantum mechanics with
decompositional equivalence supports the appearance of LOCC in cases in which observers
agree to treat their observations as observations of the same system.
The regress of classical communications encountered here is equivalent to the regress of the
von Neumann chain that motivates the adoption of “collapse” as a postulate of quantum
mechanics [17]. Following Everett [9], the usual response to this regress in the context of
minimal quantum mechanics is to postulate observation-induced “branching” between the
multiple possible outcomes at each instant of observation, with the resulting “branches”
being regarded as equally “actual” either as physically-realized classical universes (e.g.
[43, 44]) or as classical information-encoding states of a branching observer’s consciousness
(e.g. [39]). In either case, inter-branch decoherence is regarded as conferring observational
classicality, and the identity of observed systems across branches is taken for granted; hence
decompositional equivalence and observable-dependent exchange symmetry are both vio-
lated by the standard Everettian picture. The concept of branching does not, moreover,
explain how classical outcomes are encoded by the physical degrees of freedom that imple-
ment observers; it therefore leaves open the question of how the communication of classical
information is possible.
5.2 Memory is communication
The second thing to note regarding LOCC is that the physical implementation of any
classical memory, whether it comprises words written on a page or neural excitation patterns
in someone’s brain, is a quantum system. Physically accessing a classical memory requires
extracting classical information from this quantum system, and hence requires deploying
a POVM. Observable-dependent exchange symmetry assures that an observer cannot be
confidant that the physical degrees of freedom accessed with a “memory-accessing” POVM
are the same physical degrees of freedom that were accessed when a memory was encoded,
or on any previous occasion when the memory was read. Hence Bob’s predicament when
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accessing his own memory of an observation is no different from Alice’s predicament when
accessing a report from Bob; in both cases, all the usual caveats pertaining to quantum
measurement apply.
The requirement that classical memories be observed in order to function as memories ren-
ders the LOCC scenario descriptive of all reportable or even recallable observations by single
observers. When John Wheeler said “no phenomenon is a physical phenomenon until it
is an observed phenomenon” (quoted in [45] p. 191), he might as well have said that no
phenomenon is a physical phenomenon until it is an observed and reported phenomenon,
at least reported to the observer him/her/its-self via recall from memory. It is reporting
that renders observational results classical. In this sense, observational classicality is in-
trinsically public, or social; without an observer to access a report of an observation, there
is no evidence that the observation has been classically recorded. Hence explaining the
appearance of LOCC can be considered to be equivalent to explaining the ability of a single
observer to interpret a physical state, including a physical state of his/her/its own memory
system, as a classical report of a previous observation.
5.3 Implementation of POVMs by HU
Let us suppose that Alice obtains a report from Bob simply by observing his state |B〉.
If Alice is to regard a state |Bk〉 of Bob as a report, i.e. as classically encoding a state
|Sk〉 of some identified external system S, it must be possible, at least in principle, for her
to establish that a counterfactual-supporting classical correlation - a classical correlation
that exists whether observed or not - between |Sk〉 and |Bk〉 is maintained by the B− S
interaction and hence, given decompositional equivalence, by HU. The action of HU main-
tains a counterfactual-supporting classical correlation between states of S and B just in
case S and B are entangled; if the correlation that is maintained is perfect, S and B must
be monogamously entangled. Whether joint states of two identified systems appear to be
entangled is, however, dependent on the choice of basis and hence the POVM deployed to
determine their joint states [46, 47, 48, 49, 50]. Bob’s state |Bk〉 is, therefore, a classical en-
coding of |Sk〉 for Alice only if she deploys a POVM that projects |U〉 onto a Hilbert-space
bases in which |S ⊗O〉 is entangled, and is a perfectly classical encoding if this apparent
entanglement is monogamous.
To say of any observer O that “O deploys {ESi } to identify S” is, therefore, just to say
that O and S are entangled by the action of HU on the quantum degrees of freedom that
implement O and S: observation is entanglement. The existence of such entanglement is
an objective fact that is, in a universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, independent
of the boundaries of S and O. Whether S and O appear to be entangled to a third-party
observer, however, is not an objective fact; it rather depends on the POVM employed by
that observer to extract classical information from the degrees of freedom implementing S
and O. Hence while the classical correlation between S and O is “real” - i.e. physical,
a result of the action of HU - whether it appears classical to third parties is virtual, i.e.
dependent on semantic interpretation. All public communication is, therefore, nonfungible
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or “unspeakable” in the sense defined in [51]: the information communicated is always
strictly relative to a POVM - a “reference frame” in the language of [51] - that is not
specified by HU and cannot be assumed without circularity. Any publicly-communicable
classical description of the world is, therefore, intrinsically logically circular.
The intrinsic circularity of public classical communication renders an explanation of a shared
classical world in terms of fundamental physics unattainable. The shared classical world of
ordinary experience cannot, therefore, be regarded as “emergent” from fundamental physics
alone; instead it must be thought of as stipulated by the choice of a POVM, i.e. as stipu-
lated by observers themselves. From a practical point of view, however, a shared POVM
is a shared item of experimental apparatus. The conclusion that classical communication
is entanglement therefore raises the possibility of discovering an item of apparatus that
implements a POVM capable of revealing, to third-party observers, the entanglement that
transfers classical information from S to O in any particular instance. With such an appa-
ratus, it would be possible to claim a third-party understanding of the local action of HU
that implements any particular instance of classical communication.
6 Conclusion
As Bohr [52] often emphasized, physicists must rely on language, pictures, and other con-
ventionalized tools of human communication to construct descriptions of the world. They
must, moreover, rely on measurements conducted in finite regions of space and time. The
acquisition and communication of classical information is, therefore, always pursued in a
LOCC setting. What has been examined here is the question of how such communication
can be understood in terms of basic physics: minimal quantum mechanics together with
decompositional equivalence. It has been shown is that classical communication is quantum
entanglement that results deterministically from the action of HU. Such entanglement is
not publicly accessible to multiple observers without the further specification of a POVM.
Any such specification is, however, itself an item of classical information; hence any claim
that classical communication “emerges” from quantum entanglement involves logical circu-
larity. The idea that quantum theory can produce a shared classicality - can be an “ultimate
theory that needs no modifications to account for the emergence of the classical” ([53] p.
1) - therefore cannot be maintained. This loss of “emergent classicality” is, however, bal-
anced by a powerful gain: the possibility that a POVM can be discovered that will reveal,
in particular cases, the entanglement by which the transfer of classical information from
system to observer is implemented.
The dependence of physics on model-theoretic or semantic assumptions explored here ties
physics explicitly to classical computer science: the selection of a shared POVM that enables
quantum theory to get off the ground as a description of a shared observable world is fully
equivalent to the selection of a virtual-machine description that enables the description of
a physical process as the instantiation of a classical algorithm to get off the ground. All
physical descriptions are, from this point of view, specifications of classical virtual machines.
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What distinguishes “quantum” from “classical” computation is the choice of a POVM. The
increased efficiency of quantum computation is, therefore, not the result of a different kind
of device executing a different kind of behavior, but rather the result of a different choice
of description. Castagnoli [54, 55] has shown that executions of quantum algorithms can
be understood as executions of classical algorithms in which half of the required answer is
known up front; what the current analysis suggests is that this half of the required answer
is encoded by the POVM with which the initial state of a quantum computation is defined.
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